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''One More for Luck''
The Destruction of U971 by HMCS
Haida and HMS Eskimo,
24June 1944
Barry M. Gough and James A. Wood

n the evening of 23 June 1944, HMCS Haida
and HMS Eskimo set out from Plymouth,
operational base of the lOth Destroyer Flotilla
(lOth DF), to conduct a sweep of the Western
Approaches to the English Channel. Their role
was to assist in securing these waters for the
ongoing delivery of supplies and reinforcements
to the Normandy bridgehead. Across the
Channel to the southeast, American, British and
Canadian forces were now in their third week of
fighting across the fields and hedgerows of
Normandy. Operation OVERLORD had been the
largest amphibious invasion in history and,
dependent as it was on the unimpeded use of
the sea, required an intensive concentration of
air and naval forces to protect Allied supply
convoys. This naval counterpart of OVERLORD
was Operation NEPTUNE, and it was as part of
this massive undertaking that Haida and
Eskimo now steamed out of Plymouth.

O

fitted with schnorkel equipment. in a desperate,
last-ditch effort to disrupt invasion convoys.
U971 was such a boat, and earlier in June this
VII-C class submarine, under the command of
Oberleutnant zur See Walter Zeplien, had
received orders to proceed from Norway to the
English Channel. It was to be U971 's first and
last operational mission. Plagued for the entire
journey by Allied aircraft and equipment failures,
by 24 June the beleaguered U-boat was fast
approaching a fatal encounter with Haida and
Eskimo. That evening, the survivors of U971
would find themselves being taken aboard the
Allied destroyers as prisoners of war after a
somewhat exceptional encounter: "It was rare
for Tribals to kill U-boats. Usually it was the
other way around." 1

The lOth Destroyer Flotilla
MCS
and HMS
were TribalH
class destroyers: technologically some of the
most advanced naval architecture, marine
Haida

Next morning found the two Tribal-class
destroyers patrolling calm waters north of
Ushant. Commander Harry DeWolf, RCN,
onboard Haida, a decorated veteran of several
hard-fought actions in the English Channel, was
Senior Officer of the force, while HMS Eskimo
sailed under the capable direction of
Lieutenant-CommanderE.N. Sinclair, RN. Since
February, the lOth DF had been engaged in a
running battle with German destroyers and
torpedo boats, fighting for control of the narrow
sea dividing Britain from Europe. Now, faced
with the vastly superior forces of Operation
NEPTUNE, Germany had turned to its U-boat
fleet, and more specifically those boats recently

propulsion systems and weaponry of their time.
They were fast and heavily-gunned, veritable
pocket cruisers designed to participate in major
fleet engagements. Commissioned on 30 August
1943, Haidajoined the Home Fleet destroyers
based at Scapa Flow in September to prepare
for her first operational assignment: protecting
the Arctic convoys carrying urgently-needed
supplies to the Soviet Union. Convoy operations
in these far northern dark, cold, stormy waters
were major fleet exercises, under constant threat
of attack from German air and naval units based
in Norway. This was work Haida was designed
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Three Tribals (Haida at right) and HMS Black Prince (second from left) manoeuvre at high speed
March 1944. Together, Tribals of the 1Oth DF and the cruiser Black Prince formed Force 26.

for, and she won a battle honour for her part in
the operations which witnessed the sinking of
the German battle cruiser Scharnhorst at the
end of December 1943. Haida was then
reassigned to Plymouth Command in January
1944 to prowl the English Channel.
Haida's sister Tribal HMS Eskimo had a
more storied wartime career. Built in 1937, she
saw action from the earliest days of the war,
scoring her first kill on 17 October 1939 by
shooting down a German aircraft. She went on
to spend the first winter of the war on convoy
escort duties, and she later played a role in the
highly successful Second Battle ofNarvik on 13
April 1940. Here, Eskimo took part in the
complete destruction of an eight-ship German
destroyer flotilla, though in exchange she
sustained severe torpedo damage to her bow.
After repairs were completed, the veteran Tribal
was redeployed to escort duties with the Home
Fleet and later went on to help screen the Allied
landings in North Africa and Sicily. Struck by
fire from a German dive-bomber in this last
operation, Eskimo returned to England for
repairs and subsequently joined the 1Oth DF on
26 May 1944.

The naval forces gathered under Plymouth
Command served as guardians of the Western
Approaches to the English Channel. In the first
half of 1944, these hotly contested waters were
the scene of countless nocturnal skirmishes
between Allied naval forces, including the lOth
DF, and surface vessels of the German
Kriegsmarine operating out of French ports. At
the same time, the great invasion to open a front
in northwest Europe was scheduled for the
spring of 1944. "When planning the Normandy
invasion," remarks Michael Whitby, a noted
authority on the lOth DF, "Allied naval
commanders recognized that although
Kriegsmarine surface forces represented only a
limited threat to the beachhead, powerful
destroyers based in Bay of Biscay ports could
wreak havoc on vulnerable build-up convoys
crossing the Channel. "2 To meet this danger,
Plymouth Command gathered the toughest
destroyers they could find, among them all the
Tribals in Canadian service.
During the spring of 1944 the lOth DF
prowled the night waters of the Channel,
harrying German shipping and seeking battle
with enemy surface forces in offensive sweeps,
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Haida and Athabaskan conducting high speed tactical exercises in the English Channel. The 1Oth DF sank
35 surface ships, a submarine, and damaged 14 ships at the cost of losing Athabaskan on 29 April1944

and covering Allied minelaying operations along
the French coast. 3 In both cases, explains Whitby,
"the 'main objective' was to search out and
destroy the enemy. The captains of the flotilla
took [this] to heart, and this certainly
contributed to the aggressiveness, at times
verging on recklessness, that characterized the
flotilla's subsequent operations. "4 This was
Tribal warfare at its best, and Haida excelled at
it. In her first direct encounter with the enemy
on the night of 25-26 April 1944 Haida and
HMCS Athabaskan shared in the destruction
of the small destroyer T-29: the first enemy
surface vessel sunk by the Royal Canadian Navy. 5
The Germans got revenge a few nights later
when, in pursuit of two other Elbing class
destroyers, Athabaskan was rocked by "two
definite explosions, one light, one heavy- almost
simultaneously" 6 and sunk. Losing sight of one
Elbing, Haida turned her guns against the
second. With rounds impacting along the length
ofT-27, a fire broke out behind the forward gun,
blinding the bridge. Ablaze, and with few options
remaining, T-27 was run hard aground to avoid
sinking: Haida's second victory. Harry DeWolf
was awarded the Distinguished Service Order
for gallantry in action and in recognition of the
fact that in two consecutive actions, Haida had
destroyed an enemy destroyer. This feat was
unequaled in Plymouth Command, and spoke
to the power ofTribals in surface actions when
driven hard by gifted captains.

The First Patrol of U971
~ough

commissioned over a year earlier on

~ 1 April 1943, at the time of the Allied
landings in Normandy U971 was still considered

a new boat, having yet to set out on its first
operational patrol. Built in Hamburg by Blohm
& Voss, U971 was a VII-C class U-boat, an
exceptionally seaworthy, maneuverable, and
reliable craft. Like all VII-C U-boats, U971 was
built to be a workhorse, with a range of 8,500
miles at 10 knots on the surface. Originally
designed to accommodate a crew of 44, U971
was considerably more crowded in June 1944,
having brought additional men onboard to
service new anti-aircraft (AA) guns that were
installed on all VII-C boats in the later stages of
the war. The average age of the crewmen was
approximately 21, and most of the men were
inexperienced submariners. 7 The captain of
U971, Oberleutnant zur See Walter Zeplien, was
25 years old. Under different circumstances, his
first set of orders would likely have sent him off
to join the wolfpacks in the North Atlantic. As it
happened, in the spring of 1944 U971 sailed
from Kiel to Kristiansand, at the southern tip of
Norway, there to be held in readiness against
the possibility of an Allied invasion of that
country. The deception of Operation
FORTITUDE had been a success: as late as June
1944, the Germans remained uncertain as to
whether the upcoming invasion would take place
in the Pas de Calais, Normandy, or Norway. 8
9
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Tribal Class Destroyer

Type VII-C U-Boat

Manufacturer

Haida -Vickers Armstrong, Newcastle
Eskimo -V. A. Parsons, 'JYne

U971 - Blohm & Voss, Hamburg

Displacement

1960 tons standard
2745 tons full load

769 tons surfaced
871 tons submerged

Length
Beam
Draft

355.5 ft (Eskimo); 377ft (Haida)
37. 5 feet
13 feet full load

220.5 feet
20.3 feet
15.4 feet

Performance

36 knots
(32.5 full load)

surface: max. 17 knots. avg. 10 knots,
submerged: 7.6 knots for 1 hour, twin AEG
750 hp electric motors

Crew

238-259

44 ( + additional crew brought onboard to
service new AA guns)

Armament

• 3 twin mounting 4.7-inch guns
• 1 twin 4-inch gun -high angle
• 1 2-pdr quad Pom-Pom
• 6 20 mm twin Oerlikons
• 4 21-inch torpedoes
• 2 Depth Charge throwers- I 0 Mk VII DC in
position, 22 on deck. 24 between decks

Characteristics

• 8 Canadian Tribals - 4 built in Halifax &
4 built in UK
• 16 British & 3 Australian Triba1s
• "magnificent in appearance, majestic in
movement, menacing in disposition."
• Tribals were technologically advanced
ships in weaponry. propulsion, and
structure

Operation Neptune
s of 6 June 1944, both Plymouth Command
and the German U-boat arm found
themselves under new orders in response to the
invasion. Both sides understood that the success
of Overlord depended upon the ability of the
Allies to transport vast quantities of men and
materiel across the Channel. D-Day was the
greatest seaborne assault of all time and required
an armada of vessels, all gathered together under
the auspices of Operation NEPTUNE. In the first
forty-eight hours of the invasion, slow-moving
transport vessels were scheduled to land
150,000 men and 1,500 tanks over a 50-mile
stretch of the Norman coast, with a million men
and several million tons of materiel to follow in
the weeks ahead. 11

A

To counter the long-anticipated invasion, the
Germans relied on their land forces and coastal
fortifications, supplemented, with any luck, by
the 230 Kriegsmarine surface vessels stationed
in France and some 130 U-boats stationed along
the Bay of Biscay and in Norway. 12 While U-boats
could be deployed only with great difficulty amid
the shallow depths and unpredictable cross-tides
of the Channel, they posed a significant threat

• 1 AA gun- 3.5-inch (later- 37 mm)
• 2 AA guns - 20 mm
• 14 torpedoes- 21-inch. 4 tubes forward,
1 aft
• 1 deck gun - 88 mm

• 568 commissioned 1940- 1945, capable
of diving to periscope depth in 30 seconds
and a maximum dive depth to 722 feet.
• Range of 8500 miles at 10 knots on
surface. medium sized, very manoeuvrable,
reliable and exceptionally seaworthy
• most famous VII-C was U96 featured in
the movie "Das Boot"

should the Germans decide to mount a
determined offensive.
NEPTUNE's planners did not underestimate
the enemy. To counter the threat of a German
naval offensive in the Channel, both flanks of
the sea-lanes to Normandy required a screen of
warships and patrol aircraft. In the western
Channel, this task fell to Plymouth Command,
and to the destroyers of the lOth DF. It was
expected that the Germans would use their
sixteen destroyers at Brest, Cherbourg and along
the Bay of Biscay to disrupt the invasion convoys
as they crossed the English Channel. However,
a more serious threat was posed by the U-boats,
with one worst-case scenario put forward by the
Admiralty's Anti-U-boat Division speculating that
a loss of 240 ships per week was not outside
the realm of possibility. 13 Therefore, Escort
Groups composed of escort destroyers, frigates
and other smaller vessels- the anti-submarine
specialists of the North Atlantic war with the
latest in A/S sensors and weaponry - were
established to protect convoys from U-boat
attacks and to hunt them down as they
approached. The heavier-armed Tribals of the
lOth DF stood ready to counter German surface
vessels should they attempt to interfere with the
anti-submarine specialists.

10
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Operation NEPTUNE- 6 June 1944
Commander DeWolf, in his Report of
Proceedings for June 1944, described Haida's
work at the time of the invasion:
The Flotilla's invasion role was that of Covering
Force in the Western Channel to protect the
invasion convoy routes from attack by enemy
surface vessels. The Flotilla continued to operate
directly
under
the
orders
of
Commander-in-Chief, Plymouth and in effect
little change of routine resulted directly from the
invasion. With the arrival in the Channel of the
numerous A/S Escort Groups, to counter the
U-boat threat, the scope of the Flotilla's patrol
was extended to provide cover for those groups
operating near the enemy coast. 14

It was while screening the western approaches
to the Channel that Haida and HMCS Huron
shared in Haida's third surface kill when, on

the night of 9 June, they became engaged in the
largest purely naval action of Operation
NEPTUNE. During the battle between the lOth
DF and a flotilla of three large German
destroyers, Haida and Huron engaged the
powerful Narvik class Z-32, scoring a hit that

put the port engine out of commission. Another
three hits destroyed one of the ship's forward
gun mountings. For three hours they chased
Z-32, scoring repeated hits until finally a shot
from one of the Canadian Tribals shut down the
Narvik's starboard engine. With escape now
impossible, the burning Z-32 was run aground
on the rocks oflle de Batz. DeWolfwas awarded
the Distinguished Service Cross for the night's
action. The Tribals had destroyed two German
warships and extensively damaged two others:
losses the enemy could not afford with an
invasion bridgehead now established on the
mainland of northwest Europe. Moreover, Haida
established herself the pre-eminent destroyer in
the Channel, and DeWolf as a master of night
surface actions.

U-971 Sets Out for the Channel

E

ven as the lOth Destroyer Flotilla celebrated
the removal of one threat from the Channel,
a second set out from Norway to take its place.
On 6 June, a wireless signal arrived at
11
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Kristiansand announcing the Anglo-American
landings in France, followed two days later by
U971 's new orders: proceed on the surface into
the North Sea. Zeplien received a second signal
on 10 June directing him to set course for the
Atlantic via the Rosengarten off the Shetlands.
These were dangerous waters for a U-boat,
particularly given the low clouds and bad
visibility - conditions favouring Allied patrol
aircraft. 15 Initially steering as directed, Zeplien
decided his present course was too dangerous
after sighting Allied aircraft and ordered U971

The next signal Zeplien received ordered
U971 and four other U-boats to proceed to an

area of operations in the English Channel
between Plymouth and Ushant. It was to be a
passage beset by difficulties. On 13 June one of
his acoustic T5 torpedoes developed a
malfunction and had to be jettisoned. The next
morning the U -boat was forced to submerge after
being pursued by a ship that Zeplien suspected
was summoning attack aircraft. Passing near the
Faeroes on 15 June, U971 was sighted while fully
surfaced and attacked by a British Sunderland,
----~-

A Type VII-C U-Boat entering a French Biscay harbour. U971 was a type VII-C, known as the
workhorse of the Unterseebootwaffe. Shown here is U96, featured in the movie Das Boot.

onto a new heading that would pass only a few
miles north of the Faeroes.

but was able to return fire with flak armament
and force the aircraft to turn away.

Just as the orders given to Haida and
Eskimo were now dictated by the requirements

Zeplien's second encounter with patrol
aircraft did not turn out so well. On 20 June,
Coastal Command aircraft attacked the surfaced
U-boat, this time while it was passing south of
Ireland. On this occasion, a Leigh Light-equipped
Wellington bomber of 407 (RCAF) Squadron,
piloted by Flying Officer Frederick H. Foster,
attacked with depth charges and inflicted
damage to three of the four bow torpedo tubes.
Flying over the stricken U971, the Wellington's
rear-gunner also reported further damage to the
target after seeing some of the 400 rounds from
his gun ricocheting off the hull. 17 The following
day, on 21 June, a Sunderland of 228 (RAF)
Squadron and a Halifax bomber of 502 (RAF)

of the D-Day invasion, so too were those of
U-971. Admiral Donitz's unequivocal order of
June 11 to his U-boat commanders reflected the
urgency of the situation in the Channel:
The invasion fleet is to be attacked with complete
recklessness .... When it is necessary to get to
grips with the enemy landing fleet, there is no
question of any regard to danger through shallow
water or possible minefields or reservations of
any kind .... AU-boat which inflicts losses on the
enemy during landing has discharged its highest
duty and justified its existence, even if it does
not survive. 16

12
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Squadron, machine gunned U971, with the
Halifax also managing to drop a pattern of four
depth charges that fell wide of the target by only
63 feet. 18 Zeplien's green crew was quickly
learning why Allied aircraft were both feared and
despised by the U-boats.
Following the attack, the captain of U971
decided that aircraft cover was too strong and
again shifted his course. On 22 June he tested
his torpedo tubes, not knowing the full extent of
the damage. He discovered that only two tubes
remained serviceable. That same day he received
a signal stating that the most important area of
operations for U971 and the other four U -boats
was off the coast near Cherbourg. Noting the
urgency of this signal, Zeplien set course for that
area using his schnorkel. 19 This device,
essentially an intake and exhaust valve, allowed
U-boats to continue operating diesel engines
while travelling at periscope depth, thereby
avoiding detection by Allied aircraft and radar,
though at a cost of reduced visibility and speed.
In the early morning hours of 24 June, while
schnorkelling, U971 sighted two destroyers, one
dead ahead and the other off the port bow, both
at a range of about 2,000 yards. Seizing upon
this opportunity, Zeplien manoeuvred to fire a
torpedo from the stern tube, only to discover
that it could not be released. Instead, the torpedo
"ran 'hot' -its propeller started running but the
torpedo did not eject from the tube, a situation
terrifying to submariners." 2 ° Coming about for
a second attempt, Zeplien attempted to fire an
acoustic T -5 torpedo from Tube II, his only
working bow tube, but this too failed to fire. Both
destroyers then disappeared into the mist as the
crew of U971 undoubtedly cursed their boat,
loaded as it was with equipment that never
seemed to work. Three of the torpedo tubes were
damaged beyond use and an attempt at firing
the remaining two had resulted in two misfires.
One of the officers later reported that even the
head was broken, recalling that "at 0600 the boat
surfaced to dump fecal matter overboard as the
toilets were defective. "21
Oberleutnant zur See Walter Zeplien, on his
first operational mission in command of U971,
at this point made the decision that it was
hopeless to continue operating in this area
without repairs. While U971 was surfaced to
clear the defective toilets, Zeplien signaled that

he was putting into Brest, approximately 30
miles to the west. U971 was running on the
surface. At 0615 hours an aircraft was sighted
but, perhaps not surprisingly, neither the 37 mm
nor the 20 mm would fire and U971 dived. At
0730 hours, the U-boat was again brought to
the surface to proceed at full speed towards
Brest, but within twenty minutes another aircraft
was sighted. Again U971 was forced to crash
dive, this time to a depth of about 400 feet. Since
daybreak, Zeplien had brought his vessel to the
surface on two occasions and both times been
spotted by enemy aircraft within 15 to 20
minutes. Given the intensity of Allied air cover,
running below the surface using schnorkel
seemed out of the question- even if the enemy
missed the wake of the schnorkel itself, the diesel
engines still produced black clouds of exhaustand continuing along the surface without
anti-aircraft armament would be suicidal.
U971's best option at this point was to
remain submerged and use batteries, but then,
"after proceeding for about one mile toward
Brest, the batteries failed. Zeplien realized that
his only hope of escape was to proceed surfaced
under cover of darkness into Brest. He ordered
the men into their bunks and all hands were
issued with potash cartridges. "22 Intending to
rest on the ocean floor until after sundown before
making a break on the surface for Brest, there
was to be no sleep for the crew of U971. Within
less than an hour, at 0830 hours, an Asdic
signature was noted by a passing Allied vessel
and a series of depth charge attacks commenced.
Leutnant zur See Helmut Buchholz, Second
Watch Officer of U971, later reported that these
attacks continued all day, every 20 minutes,
always with 12 bombs. 23

The Attack: Haida and Eskimo
"Roar off to the Spot"
n 23 June, Haida, in company with Eskimo,
swept inside the Channel Isles in support
of the Light Coastal Forces operating offSt-Malo,
returning to the area off Land's End the next
morning. At 0848 hours Plymouth ordered the
two Tribals to proceed south across the Channel.
With DeWolf acting as Senior Officer, their new
task was to act in support of the Captain F.J.
Walker's famous U -boat killers the 2nd Escort
Group by ensuring that German destroyers did
not attempt to interfere with their

O

14
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anti-submarine sweep. It took the Trtbals nearly
four hours to make the crossing, and upon their
arrival Haida received a signal from Captain
Walker that aU-boat had recently been sighted
by aircraft northwest of Ushant. 24
While the 2nd Escort Group was conducting
its search, the two Tribals established their
patrol line to the north, zig-zagging in line abreast
at 25 knots. It was a calm, cloudless day, with

minutes later. With the celebrated U-boat killer,
Captain Johnny Walker, only a few miles off,
DeWolf signalled the 2nd Escort Group: "We have
a submarine here, would you like to take over?''
"No," came the reply, "go ahead and get on with
it." 28 DeWolf also notified other Escort Groups
in the area of the situation, expecting the A/ S
specialists to take over as soon as possible.
DeWolf was keenly aware that Tribals were not

RAF Photograph of Haida making good speed off the coast of England, 1944. Haida and Eskimo were Tribal-class
destroyers, noted as fast, versatile, heavily-gunned ships that inspired their officers and men with pride.

excellent visibility, and at 1545 hours both ships
reported sighting a Liberator some 5 miles
astern dropping depth charges or bombs.
Moments earlier, Flying Officer Jan Vella of 311
(Czech) Squadron RAF had sighted the periscope
of aU-boat on the surface at 49 00' N, 05 40' W
-approximately half-way across the Channel
between Ushant and Land's End. Vella engaged
the enemy with rockets and depth charges and
dropped a smoke float to mark the U-boat's last
position. 25 The Liberator then turned away to
attack a second periscope that had appeared
nearby, again using rockets and depth charges. 26
According to DeWolf, a report of aU-boat on
the surface was welcome news, "so we roared
off to that spot." He continued, "We couldn't talk
to the Czech, we couldn't understand him and
he couldn't understand us, but we did get the
messages he was sending to the Admiralty. "27 By
the time Haida and Eskimo had arrived on the
scene, the Liberator had lost contact with the
target- U971 .

"One More for Luck"
Qoth Haida and Eskimo reduced speed to 7
.L.lknots in order to facilitate their asdic search.
Eskimo was the first ship to detect the
submarine, with Haida obtaining contact a few

properly equipped for and had no real
experience with hunting U-boats. At this point,
it even seemed likely that the target had managed
to escape and that Haida and Eskimo were now
pursuing a false contact. Nevertheless, the two
Tribals continued "the hunt, pending the arrival
of EG 15. When the latter heard that two fleet
class destroyers [Tribals) were attacking an
immobile target that seemed to be on the bottom,
they left Haida and Eskimo to pursue their own
folly. " 29 This is the view of Marc Milner.
Signalman George Mannix later recalled:
Cdr DeWolf decided to abandon this
questionable pursuit and carry on with his
ordered Tunnel Operation. At this, the normally
mild mannered and controlled A/S team,
... Lieutenant John Coates and ... Chief Petty
Officer John Lipton, rushed to the bridge in high
excitement and insisted on further prosecution
of the echo, convinced they had a sub. So DeWolf
revised his decision and soon the team gained
contact with the sub at about 1600, drifting with
the current just clear of the bottom. 30

From 1626 hours to 1825 hours the two ships
carried out nine complete depth charge attacks,
seven of them by Eskimo. By 1749 hours, eight
of these patterns had been dropped. Although
no visible results from the attacks could be
discerned at first, it was believed that the
submarine could still be lurking somewhere in
15
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ROUTE of U-971
FIRST OPERATIONAL PATROL
JUNE 1944
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the immediate area. At 1803 hours, after almost
two hours of attacking, DeWolf signalled to
Eskimo: "Will drop one more pattern for luck." 31
This final barrage came at 1825 hours.
Now the cat and mouse waiting game had
begun. The depth of water here was 250 feet,
hardly enough for the U-boat to make a deep
dive, and she could only lie quietly on the ocean
floor. Earlier that afternoon, after more than
seven hours of depth-charging, Zeplien had
decided to ascend to periscope depth, probably
looking for an opportunity to replenish U971 's
air supply. Instead, he had been attacked by an

Allied aircraft, suffering further damage in the
process, and forced to crash dive to the bottom.
At this point, "the likely course of action for a
U -boat being hunted was to bottom and lie 'with
the tide' (bow resting on the bottom and stern
pointing down the direction of the tide stream)
no more than 2-4,000 yards from its would-be
target. This trick is what U971 played on Haida
and Eskimo. "32 Lying on the bottom, particularly
close inshore and affected by tides, Zeplien knew
that U971 would present a difficult target, as
asdic echoes bounced in all directions,
complicated by schools of fish, rock ledges, and
differences in salinity from fresh-water run-off.
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Under these circumstances, according to Harry
DeWolf: "I thought- well, the Channel here is
full of wrecks, so we're probably bombarding
wrecks on the bottom and we'll go on doing that
till we give up or we've already destroyed the
submarine and it's on the bottom. "33 Thus, by
1825 hours, he was ready to call an end to the
hunt and decided to carry out one last attack.
Unknown to Haida and Eskimo, their "one
more pattern for luck" caused the situation
aboard U971 to deteriorate rapidly. "The first
water entry occurred at 1830 hours through the
stern glands, and shortly afterwards water came
through the vents to diving tank No.3. "34 Repairs
were quickly made, but it goes without saying
that by this point the crew was getting very
nervous. Now in their eleventh hour of
intermittent depth charging since the first attack
that morning, by 1830 hours the crew of U971
had endured the last two hours under
near-constant bombardment by the two
destroyers above, who as yet were showing no
sign of giving up until the job was done. It was
to be a hunt to exhaustion, and the strain was
beginning to take its toll on Zeplien and his crew.
For almost an hour after the last depth
charge attack was completed, Haida lay still in
the water, listening for any indication of the
submerged U-boat. At the same time, Eskimo

had lost contact with the target, and was quietly
conducting a slow-speed search. As they waited,
Haida's crew undoubtedly thought back to a few
weeks before when a torpedo that seemed to
come out of nowhere had slammed into their
sister-ship, Athabaskan. To make matters
worse, by this time the Czech Liberator's report
of a second periscope in the area had probably
been translated by headquarters and
retransmitted in English.

Desperate Action and
Lightning Response

T
U

]"971 was running out of options. The

batteries were dead and it seemed decidedly
unlikely that a working torpedo could be found
anywhere on the boat. Air quality was poor, with
just enough left to surface. 35 According to later
testimony by the prisoners, at this point "the
Captain made up his mind that escape was
unlikely, further depth charging too awful to
contemplate, and that the only thing to do was
to surface and save his crew."36 He explained the
plan to the officers and men while standing
knee-deep in the water of the control room and
finishing off the last of U971 's beer ration. After
ordering all secret gear and papers destroyed,
at 1900 hours Zeplien thanked the crew for their
loyalty and ordered the ballast tanks blown.
U971 then began a rapid rise to the surface.

Depth charge explosion off stern of Haida. After Eskimo and Haida launched eight depth charge attacks against U971,
Commander DeWolf decided upon "one more for luck" at 1825 hours. This final barrage was the only one causing real
damage, forcing the U-boat to surface.
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View from Haida 24 June 1944 after destruction of U971. Eskimo stands
by as a motor boat from Haida goes to rescue the remaining
six U-boat survivors, including the captain, Zeplien.

Haida and Eskimo were in the final stages
of preparing another depth charge attack when
the asdic officer reported to DeWolf that the
submarine was blowing tanks and coming up
rapidly. U971 then broke the surface some eight
hundred yards off Haida's port bow. At this,
Haida's gunners burst into immediate action,
bringing the forward "B" gun mounting onto the
target and opening fire. Al Warner, a rating from
Haida, recalled the scene:
The submarine was almost between us and the
Eskimo, and she [Eskimo] went full astern to
back up when the boys opened up wiih the 20
mm. "B" gun was fully manned at this time, and
when the submarine surfaced they depressed
the gun to fire at the submarine. We were cruising
with the guns elevated at 45 degrees,
anti-submarine positions, "A" gun off to
starboard, "B" gun to port. The sub was so close
[200 yards] they had to depress "A" gun so "B"
wouldn't hit the barrels. That gave Eskimo time
to back up before we opened fire. The first salvo

hit the sub; the second, too. That's all "B" gun
fired. Two salvoes, four hits. 37

As DeWolf described it: "a hit was obtained
on the conning tower, with the second salvo. High
explosive was used and penetrated the conning
tower, starting a fire, the flames being clearly
visible through the hole made." 38 The enemy
could offer no resistance. "B" mounting and
small arms fire was quickly checked once it
became apparent that the enemy did not intend
to fight.
The U-boat lay awash. Men were coming up
on deck and jumping over the side. As the crew
began to abandon ship, both Haida and Eskimo
closed for boarding and lowered their whalers
in an attempt to reach the stricken submarine
before it went down. Any chance of capturing
the U-boat intact, however, or recovering secret
documents or equipment quickly disappeared:

18
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the damage inflicted by Haida's gunnery was
lethal. The submarine capsized and quietly
slipped beneath the waves of the Channel.
Although small explosions were later heard, it
seems likely that U971 was destroyed by gunfire
rather than by the scuttling charges set by the
crew. 39 U971 was lost at 1917 hours, at 49 01'N
05 35'W, northwest ofUshant. "Three hours of
depth charging and three minutes of gunfire had
ended her story, the first bringing her to the
surface and the second sending her smashed to
the bottom. "40
The task of rescuing the German crewmen
was then set upon, with fifty-two of the fifty-three
officers and men being recovered, 46 taken
onboard Eskimo while Haida screened, and the
other six taken into Haida. Of the survivors, six
were injured, three seriously, including one
rating who had been shot through the hand a
few days earlier during one of the air attacks.
Another casualty, having suffered a wound to his
leg, probably caused by a 20mm round from the
Oerlikons, was given an emergency blood
transfusion. While this was going on, there also
seems to have been some tough-talk by the
prisoners, as Haida rating Warner continued:
I understand, also, that when the survivors were
picked up and taken aboard our ship, one of
them asked if this was the G-63. We said yes. He
says, "Well, you have the other ship [Eskimo] to
thank for your lives." They'd pinpointed us and
were goin' to let go their torpedoes, but when

they scanned the surface and saw the Eskimo
they knew that if they torpedoed us, the Eskimo
was right there; they'd be dead within an hour.
They were lookin' out for themselves. 41

This is all assuming, of course, that a working
torpedo could be located somewhere in U971.
The destruction of U971 exemplified Harry
DeWolfs actions in the English Channel. His
determination to stay with the action, his
aggressiveness and good fortune often paid off.
A true leader, he had listened to his officers when
they urged him to stay with the chase, even
though it could not be certain that the target
remained in the area. It was the last depth charge
pattern, dropped "for luck" at 1825, that caused
the final damage and forced U971 to the
surface. 42

Reflections on the
Destruction of U971
nce the rescue was complete and the whalers
recovered, Haida accompanied Eskimo to
Falmouth, arriving at 0300 on 25 June 1944.
Here, the prisoners from U971 were sent ashore
for internment before the two Tribals returned
to Plymouth. Passing the harbour gate, Haida
received a signal from Black Prince: "Elbings,
Narviks, and submarines all seem to come alike
to you." To this DeWolf replied that it was just
Saturday recreation for the crew. 43

O

Survivors of U971 Awaiting Rescue, 24 June 1944. Eskimo took 46 prisoners onboard as Haida screened.
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Captain of HMCS Haida Commander H. G. DeWolf.
Awarded the Distinguished Service Cross three times as
well as the Distinguished Service Order, DeWolf is
Canada's most renowned fighting sailor. He had the Nelson
touch: the desire 'to engage the enemy more closely'.

rather, designed for surface action. The
versatility of Tribal destroyers, the two
commanders and their crews, along with the
repeated practice of lOth DF had all paid off in
the destruction of U971.

Later assessments of the attack on the
U-boat contained comments in regards to future
anti-submarine work with Tribal-class
destroyers. The commander of Eskimo stated:
In spite of this success I am strongly of the
opinion that Tribals should not engage in
prolonged A/ S work. An Escort Group should
take over at the first possible opportunity. I think
it is reasonable to sit on a contact for a short
period, but early relief by the proper A/S ships
from Escort Groups is most desirable. Though
this success adds to the variety of the 1Oth
Flotilla's bag, and is a feather in our cap, it
should not be taken as too strong an
encouragement to go after U-boats when so many
better equipped vessels are available. 44

Commander Sinclair went on to capture the
spirit of the moment by adding to his report on
the sinking of U971: "though it does show that
such good opportunities must be taken without
hesitation when they occur." Herein lay a special
strength of DeWolf as Senior Officer. He had
seized control of an unanticipated situation,
resulting in pragmatic and persistent teamwork
alongside Eskimo. An expert in the use of
Haida's main armament, he had on this occasion
made effective use of anti-submarine equipment
even though Tribals are not sub-hunters, but

In contrast, U971 began running short on
luck in the early stages of its command. Some
of Zeplien's decisions have been questioned. In
Eskimo's "Information Obtained from
Prisoners," for example, it is stated that none of
the crew interviewed could explain why the
German submarine was running on the surface
during daylight hours of 24 June. The report
indicates that "the crew were quite mystified as
to why it was necessary - they did not think it
was, in fact, necessary at all." However, in an
account of the sinking, Second Watch Officer
Helmut Buchholz stated that U971 had been
obliged to surface to empty holding tanks and
clear out foul air. Although the U-boat had been
fitted with a schnorkel in April of 1944, 45 there
were several reasons why Zeplien had chosen
to run on the surface. Given the damage suffered
in repeated attacks, he had decided to make
speed on the surface to Brest. Using the
schnorkel, he would have had to contend with
reduced visibility and speed. Further, given the
clear visibility on 24 June, the wake produced
by a schnorkel on calm seas and the diesel
exhaust would not likely have gone unnoticed
by Allied patrol vessels and aircraft.
In Eskimo's report of the sinking, Sinclair
called Zeplien's actions "stupid" for remaining
stationary after being spotted by the Liberator.
He stated that it would have been a much more
difficult operation had Zeplien used different
tactics. 46 Buchholz, on the other hand, stated,
"Since a silent running was not possible due to
damage to the rear shaft drive, the boat was set
on the seabed." The extent of the damages
suffered by U971 over the course of her journey
had left her without essential weapons, unable
to proceed using battery power, and ultimately
with a diminishing air supply. By 1900 hours
on 24 June, Zeplien had to choose: either bring
U971 to the surface, or die.
Several RN and RCN decorations were
granted as a result of this action. DeWolf and
Sinclair were both recognized for their
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leadership. Lipton was recommended for
decoration and received the Distinguished
Service Medal and Coates was Mentioned in
Despatches "for outstanding devotion to
duty ... during a hunt which resulted in the
destruction of an enemy submarine. "47 These
were the two officers who convinced DeWolf to
persist with the attack, even though, as DeWolf
explained years later with classic
understatement, "Frankly, I hadn't much
confidence in our ability to sink the bloody thing.
We weren't in that kind of game, we hadn't had
any practice at it. "48 Able Seaman T.F. Cuthbert
and Able Seaman R.H. MacLeod, operators in
the Asdic Control Room, were Mentioned in
Despatches. Commander Basil Jones, RN,
Senior Officer of the lOth DF, congratulated
DeWolffor the victory, calling it "another feather
in Haida's Headdress" 49 - a fitting tribute for a
Tribal. On Dominion Day of 1944, Commander
DeWolf was promoted to the rank of Captain by
the Government of Canada.

Mterword
"I..]"appy Haida," was noted for h~r success
J. l.and luck. In his memoirs, Commander
Jones paid tribute to DeWolf: "Hard-over Harry
was an outstanding officer, not only in skill but
in aggressive spirit. Furthermore, he had that
priceless gift offortune ... ofthere always being a
target in whatever area he was told to operate. "50
The continued good fortune of Haida, however,
meant destruction for U971. It also led to an
increased admiration for the versatility of the
Tribals. While Allied Escort Groups, specifically
trained in anti-submarine (A/S) warfare, had
planned and practised repeatedly to keep the
D-Day shipping lanes free from U-boat attack,
they had been short on luck. "After nearly three
weeks of tireless effort by the A/ S specialists
during which they had managed to sink only one
U -boat, the A/ S novices of the 1Oth Flotilla sank
one on their first try." 51
The risks had been great for the crews of
Haida, Eskimo and U971, yet only one man died

in the encounter. It had been a relatively
bloodless battle, especially considering the fate
of so many other U -boat crews. By 1944, the life
expectancy of a new U-boat had plummeted to
almost a single patrol. On the Allied side, the
fate of Athabaskan had already shown how close
to the line a ship's crew could be at any time.

The destruction of U971 illustrated the high
degree of co-operation in the Channel among the
ships of the RCN and RN, as well as among the
aircraft of the RAF and RCAF. Over the course
of nine days, U971 suffered attacks by RCAF
422 and 407 Squadrons and by 502, 228, and
311 (Czech) Squadrons of the RAF. HMS Eskimo
and HMCS Haida together brought an end to
the long pursuit. The victory had been one link
within the massive accomplishments of
Operation NEPTUNE.
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